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DIVISION AMONG THE RANKS: THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF CASE TOOLS FOR SYSTEM DEVELOPERS
Wanda J. Orlikowski
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ABSTRACT
This paper explores how the introduction of CASE tools in systems development changes the social
relations among project team members. An investigation into the role of CASE tools on projects
found structural changes due to modification of the systems development division of labor and shifts in
patterns of dependency among project team coalitions. These changes triggered a polarization among
the system developers which was evinced in acts of coercion and rebellion, the display of territorialism,

resentment, and stereotyping, as well as the enactment of subcultures. These findings are interpreted
within a broader social theoretic framework, and their implications for research and practice are
discussed.
1.

INTRODUCTION

and Scacchi 1982; Markus 1983; Weick 1984) and it
invariably exerts a reciprocal influence on that context

Today we are seeing tremendous interest and investment
in the automation of the systems development process.
This trend towards Computer-Aided Software Engineering
(CASE) tools is an attempt to remedy the apparent lack

of computer-based support for systems developers, a lack
to which many of the ills of the systems building process
have been attributed. CASE tools are software programs

(Giddens 1984). Similarly, we can expect that the informa-

tion technology deployed to support/automate systems
development (CASE tools) will interact with the organizational context, introducing perturbations into the social
relations surrounding tool development and use. Drawing

on an empirical study, this paper recounts how the deploy-

ment of CASE tools in systems development changed
social relations among developers, providing insight into
some organizational changes triggered by automating

which automate or support tasks typically constituting
information systems development practice. There is no
general agreement as to what functionality a CASE tool
should provide, but most would agree that CASE tools

systems development.

comprise some subset of the following elements: screen

The following section provides background to the research

and report design aids, text and diagram editors, data

study, outlining the organizational context and history

modeling tools, data dictionaries, code generators, testing

within which CASE tools were introduced. Section three
investigates the structural changes engendered by CASE
tools and describes the behavioral response of system
developers. Section four discusses the meanings of these
changes for the developers in terms of their perspectives
and subculturc affiliations. Section five reviews the
findings, recasting them in terms of a more general, social
theory. The paper concludes by outlining some implications for practice and for future research into the social
issues surrounding CASE tools.

and debugging tools. The major advantages that have been
advertised for CASE tools include increased responsiveness to user needs in the face of changing requirements,

increased systems development productivity, decreased
systems development time, enhanced system quality,
standardization, ability to replace project personnel easily,

and the capability to solve larger and more complex
problems (Case 1985; Freedman 1986; Stamps 1987).

While some of these benefits may be realizable, the
mechanisms through which CASE tools are successfully

implemented are not identified. There are few, if any,
detailed analyses of actual CASE tool implementations,

2.

and little empirical data is available on the organizational

2.1 The Research Study

BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

effects of using automated means to develop systems.
Most discussions of CASE tools focus on technical and
project management criteria with little discussion, and
hence little understanding, of the social implications of
using CASE tools. Information technology, as is by now
well accepted, can never be deployed in a vacuum. Its
form and function are always influenced by the social
context within which it is embedded (Boland 1979; Kling

The discussion in this paper draws on a research study that

investigated the automation of the systems development

process in a large, northeastern software consulting firm
(henceforth known as the Beta Consulting Corporation).
The software consulting firm, in operation since the 1960s,

employs about 600 consultants and develops computer-

based information systems for its clients across various
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industries: financial services, manufacturing, retail, and

identified and sought out both within and outside Beta.
Data was also collected throughout the study at monthly

government. These information systems are typically large,

transaction-processing applications used by clients to

support their major administrative activities.

(all day) division meetings and in project training sessions
on CASE tools.

Beta's

operations are organized by project, with project teams
varying from around ten to over a hundred personnel, and

Beta has not diffused its CASE tools on a corporate-wide

projects extending from a few months to a number of years
in duration. Project costs range from a hundred thousand

basis, but has followed a phased implementation with
major offices first adopting the tools, followed by the

to a few million dollars. As a consequence of the growing
demand for large, complex, integrated application software,

smaller offices. Because offices regularly share personnel
to take advantage of stack resources, it was possible to find

developers having differential exposure to the CASE tools.

Beta has -- over the last two decades -- attempted to
streamline as much of its systems development practice as
possible. The most recent and visible manifestation of this
strategy is the construction and deployment of CASE tools

Thus, on the projects studied, there were developers who

systems development support in Beta dates back more than

had never used CASE tools before, as well as developers
who were four and five year veteran tool users. This
differential exposure to tool use facilitated a natural
contrast that revealed interesting insights into how systems

five years, in contrast to most firms which have not yet

developers perceive and interact with CASE tools.

within project teams. This shift towards computer-based

seriously committed to CASE.1

2.2 Project Teams Before the Use of
CASE Tools

The findings discussed here are part of a larger research

study that focused on the organizational changes that
accompanied Beta's implementation of CASE tools in its
systems development operations (Orlikowski 1988). The

The history of project team composition in Beta indicates

that gradually over the last two decades a partitioning

study employed ethnographic techniques (Agar 1980; Van
Maanen 1979, 1988) such as observation of participants,
interaction with CASE tools, documentation review, social
contact, unstructured and semi-structured interviews. It
was executed over eight months within Beta and in those

between functional and technical expertise was established
within system development teams.
This partitioning,

however, was only institutionalized with the introduction of
CASE tools during the last five years, when a number of
structural changes underscored the division among the

client sites where Beta developers were building application

project team members, accentuating relations ofpower and
dependence. Before proceeding to the discussion of these
organizational changes, the evolution of project team

systems. In the first phase of the research, historical data

on the Beta corporation and its systems development
practices was gathered from published material (in-house
and trade press), and from interviews with senior managers

relations in Beta over time is sketched out.

who had been involved in Beta's traditional systems
development, as well as its adoption of a computer-based
systems development process.

In the late 1960s, Beta personnel working on systems
development projects were not differentiated by expertise
so much as by what stage in the systems development

With some background information on Beta and its

process they serviced. Thus, some people specialized in

practices, five different application projects (four large and

the upfront conceptual work of systems specification,
performing information requirements determination and
systems analysis, while others conducted actual system
implementations via functional and technical design,

one small) were selected for indepth analyses. Projects
were not selected at random but were strategically identified to guarantee exposure to the use of CASE tools in all

major phases of the systems development life cycle
(requirements analysis, conceptual design, detailed design,

programming, testing, and installation. While this type of
specialization did lead to differentiated knowledge and
experience, the lines were not drawn along functional and

implementation, and testing). An average of four weeks
was spent on each project, observing and interviewing team

technical expertise. Largely as a result of the unanticipated

members in their daily systems development work, and in

weaknesses of this temporal schism -- having two different

their interaction with each other and the CASE tools.
There were 120 interviews conducted, each lasting an
average of one and a half hours. Participation in the
research was voluntary and while the particular projects
examined were selected by Beta's semor management,

teams develop a single system for a client often resulted in
many development inefficiencies4 as well as duplicate client
negotiations -- the tasks of the development process were

bundled together, so that a single team carried a project
through in its entirety.

individuals within projects were invited to participate in the
study by the researcher alone. These individuals spanned
Beta's hierarchic levels from the most junior analysts and

A division of labor which encouraged functional and
technical specialization quickly emerged within such a

single project team structure. This specialization was
driven by the size and complexity of applications that Beta
began to develop and was encouraged by the software
engineering tenets gaining ascendancy in the carly 19706.

programmers to senior project managers.2 Other key
informants, such as the senior recruiting officer, the
director of research and development, sales directors,
major client managers, and furmer Beta employees, were
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Even as different tasks were assigned to various teamappointed specialists, all the tasks concerned the building
of an application -- the target system -- for the current
client. None of the project team members were responsible for supporting the activities of other team members.
Hence, dependencies on the project resulted from coordi-

sentiment from local project managers was that these
technical specialists were too inexperienced in functional

matters, too focused on narrow technologies, and too
removed from the daily exigencies of projects to benefit
applications development. Out of these pressures and
frustrations, the concept of "localized technical groups"
emerged in Beta about ten years ago. Each local office

nating disparate tasks, rather than from a differential
distribution of resources. Functional and technical specializations on teams were informally negotiated and sustained,

now develops its own cadre of technical experts -- consultants specializing in technical matters -- to support client

were temporary (lasting only the duration of a project),

projects specific to each local office through close and daily
involvement in systems development.

and were not officially recognized by Beta's structural
apparatus (its hierarchy, assignment mechanism, promotion

and reward schedule). In the early 1970s, Beta did not

By establishing local technical groups, Beta personnel in

formally differentiate its personnel along lines of expertise.

local offices are formally differentiated by functional or

3.

technical expertise. Like their functional counterparts,
technical consultants are assigned to client projects on a
full-time basis. Each project team now comprises two
distinct types of personnel: the "functional team" (drawn

RESPONDING TO CASE TOOLS
AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

from the general pool of local functional consultants), and

3.1 Setting the Stage for CASE Tools

the "technical team" (drawn from the local technical
group). Initially, functional consultants developed application systems while technical consultants supported their

In the mid-1970s, however, information technology became

functional colleagues in the technical aspects of application

increasingly integrated, diverse and technically complex,
encompassing different hardware and software standards,
sophisticated operating systems, database management

development. Technical consultants were the experts on

CICS, VM/CMS, IMS, ADABAS, UNIX, telecommunications, performance tuning, the technical feasibility of
various proposed designs, and so on. They were largely
uninvolved in developing application systems, playing a

systems, networks, and multiple computer configurations.
Beta recognized that in order to deliver "leading edge"

systems, project teams would have to augment their level
of technical expertise. Senior Beta management formally

staff role to the functional consultants' line role.

In

particular (with the rare exception of applications based on
sophisticated telecommunications networks or esoteric
systems software), they did not represent significant

designated some individuals as the firm's technical "experts"

and a separate division within Beta was formed to house
them. Personnel for the technical division were specifically

recruited from computer science schools and were not
assigned to particular project teams. Instead of spending
time on clients' sites building application systems, they
were located at Beta's headquarters to research new

3.2 Enter CASE tools

technological innovations and to serve as general technical
consultants to projects on an as-needed basis. This latter
responsibility required them to travel to projects for a few

With the growing sophistication of systems being demanded by clients, and the consequent increased system

components on a project's critical path.

days at a time to provide the technical knowledge that local
project teams lacked. While the technical expertise of
these specialists was formally recognized by Beta, little

development time-frames and project costs, Beta manage-

ment decided that local technical consultants should
develop capabilities to support the project teams. At first,

power
accrued
as their
involvement
with
projects
was
minor,
andtoit them
is project
engagements
that
earn
revenues and hence influence within Beta. The technical
specialists were generally perceived as advisors and
referred to as the "consultants' consultants." The technical

these capabilities com] rised what came to be known as the
technical architecture. Senior managers in Beta realized
that they could leverage their projects by allowing a few of

the technical consultants to build the generic, technical

foundation for all of a project's application programs,

expertise furnished was strictly concerned with the hard-

rather than have each functional consultant develop their
own. They found they could avoid duplicated effort and
the inevitable inconsistencies that arise when team members work in isolation. In this way, time was saved and the

ware and software environment within which application
systems were being built. There was, as yet, no notion of
using information technology to support systems develop-

ment work.

work was easier to correct, validate, and refine (thus

improving the quality of the product). There was also less
need for functional consultants to be technically knowledgeable before they could develop application systems.

Beta's systems development practice grew and the demand
for technically complex application systems increased.
Time pressure on technical specialists limited even further
their already sporadic contact with project teams and, as
a result, their contributions to local systems development

efforts were shortlived and superficial.

. This represents somewhat of a shift in the work performed

by technical consultants on projects, changing from a
purely advisory role to one that builds a substantial portion

The general
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activity of the technical team had come increased responsibility and power as the functional team became heavily
dependent on the technical team, whose activities facilitated their productive work.

of the application system under development for the client.
This technical architecture built by the technical team does

not strictly constitute CASE tools, as it forms part of the
client's application system rather than a technology owned
by Beta. However, it clearly was its forerunner, as in
practice it amounts to information technology that assists
functional consultants' development work by eliminating
their need to build complex technical procedures in their

4.

MEDIATING THE MEANING OF
STRUCTURAL CHANGE

programs.

Following the increased dependence of project teams on
a technical infrastructure (technical architecture and CASE

In the early 1980s, the idea of fully-fledged CASE tools, inhouse technology dedicated to supporting systems developers, had taken hold in Beta and over time a number of

different CASE tools were developed on separate Beta

tools), project social relations became polarized around
two very different perspectives: the technical and the
functional. Each of these perspectives represents a

projects and quickly diffused throughout the firm. As

separate subculture that has formed within Beta, reflecting

they began to be a common feature of all large system
development projects, mediating many systems develop-

different perceptions of and interactions with clients,
project goals, and systems development activities in
general. The strength of the polarization was surprising·

ment practices.

Concomitantly, the role of technical

given the fairly strong and relatively homogeneous corpo-

consultants on projects began to change. Not only were
they responsible for providing technical advice and building
the technical architecture, they were now also responsible

for setting up, modifyin , and maintaining Beta's CASE

rate culture that pervades Beta, but it adds support to
Riley's (1983) contention that multiple subcultures develop
even within a more overarching culture. The following
discussion examines how the norms, orientations, and

tools at each client site.

interests of the different subcultures mediated individuals'

CASE tools became more widely known throughout Beta,

understanding of and actions towards CASE tools and each
other.

33 Structural Changes Following CASE Tools
4.1 Functional Subculture

As the technical architecture and CASE tools became
more critical to the systems development process, the
technical team responsible for them began to play a pivotal
role on each project. Reflecting this change in scope, the

4.1.1

Functional Perspective

technical contingent on projects increased in size (from
some five percent of the project team members to about
twenty percent). The use of technical architectures and
CASE tools radically changed the dependence relations of
the project team. Whereas before, the functional consultants called on the technical team on an as-needed basis,
now they had to rely on the technical consultants to set up
the tools and the architecture before they could perform
any substantive work. The technical team's installation of
tools and building of the technical architecture had become
key stages on the critical path of systems development
projects. Further, the technical team had to become more
intimately involved in analysis and design decisions. That
is, the structure of the technical architecture and CASE

Functional consultants perform the substantive work of
Beta's systems development practice. They do not perceive
themselves as "system developers," but as "business consul-

tants" who develop functional solutions for client business
problems through the medium of information technology.
The medium is considered less important than the func-

tionality that is provided.

Information technology is

apprehended as the means through which valued ends are
achieved, rather than an end in itself. Hence, the information technology used by functional consultants is valued for

its instrumental contribution to their work. Their general
stance towards human activity (Schein 1987, pp. 101-102)
reflects a results orientation, that is, a focus on "doing"

(achievement and accomplishment) rather than a focus on
"being" (process and development). Their time orientation

tools were constraints on possible application designs, while
the conceptual systems design influenced the content of the

is the present and their context local. They concentrate

technical architecture and CASE tools implemented. The
technical team began to assume more of a production role
as opposed to its prior, purely support role, which had not

their energies on building a system for the current situation

and completing the immediate project. Their attitude
towards information technology (both the CASE tools and
the actual technology used to build client application
systems) reflects their results orientation and instrumentalism; they objectify it. Thus, functional consultants, even

involved any direct involvement in applications development work.
The division of labor on systems development projects had
changed, with functional consultants relinquishing many

though they use information technology as a raw material

in their work -- building and fashioning a system for clients

technical tasks to the technical consultants, whose involve-

out of an amalgam of hardware and software -- appear to

ment in project activities had shifted from the periphery to
the center. Accompanying the increased visibility and

be unaware of, or to ignore, the often arbitrary and
nontechnical aspects of information technology. They treat
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CASE as a neutral, abstract object, that facilitates rational

and deliberate manipulation and that can be deployed
across client contexts, application domains, and problem
types.

Now (after CASE tools were introduced) there is a
distinct lack of communication between the technical
and functional teams, because we have mutually
exclusive tasks and motivations. Before we worked on

Their focus was on providing
technical support and expertise as needed and
the same thing.
4.1.2

Conflict Over Expertise

demanded by us, the functional team. They provided

a service; they were the internal consultants.

When local technical groups were first initiated within Beta

Now

they produce a product, the program shells and the

and technical consultants joined project teams to provide
technical advice, functional consultants appreciated the
support and service they received from these "backroom
guys,„7 who resolved tricky technical issues in the systems
being built, thereby helping functional consultants achieve

their desired ends. The central role of the functional
consultants as primary producers of application systems
was not threatened or challenged. There was little felt
dependence on the technical consultants, who kept a low

bridges, and they ore less concerned with support.

There has been a big change in roles between the two

teams. The onus for solving technical problems is
now a functional responsibility. The technical team
feel they have other things to do than support us. But

we feel they are there to support us....There is a
concern that they are getting too caught up in the
design, that they may dictate the design. It is important that the tech team assume an advisory role and

not drive the design.

profile and whose advice dealt with the information
technology itself. The technical consultants did not in any

substantial way shape the direction or content of work

performed by functional consultants.

Such different perceptions indicate that functional and

technical consultants have well-defined yet opposing
expectations of each others' roles and responsibilities,

With the implementation of CASE tools on projects came
a change in the responsibilities and role of technical
consultants. Perceptions among functional consultants and

resulting in conflict over expertise and the bounds of

legitimate action. A subtle territorialism has emerged
within Beta which is manifest in the stereotyping and

relations between the technical and functional teams have
been noticeably affected. The technical consultants are
now seen to perform many development functions. They

subcultural activities engaged in by the groups of consultants.

are no longer the "technical gums" offering backstage
advice; they have moved firmly into center stage, both in
terms of the importance of their work to the project and
in terms of the financial investment their work represents
to Beta and its clients. The functional consultants feel

4.13

somewhat upstaged and less in control of the exigencies of
their work. The activities of the technical consultants are

Stereotyping the Technical Consultants

There is a deeply felt sense among the functional team that
the technical consultants are just interested in the techno-

now on the critical path of the project, so they directly
influence and constrain the work of functional consultants.

logy and in "hacking" the most elegant design or code
without regard for what support the functional teams
needs, or when. One functional consultant commented on

Functional consultants are acutely aware of their dependence on the technical team, whose tools and technical

the technical team's attitude by noting:

architecture they are required to employ. A functional

The technical team should rely more on the

manager commented on the change.

functional team than they do. They have their
own ideas and don't want to know the functional
story. They are not open to criticism.

The technical team had no formal role on the
team before tools. They did technical advising

They feet

some ownership of the tools and so are very

and resolved technical issues. Now they are the
key part of the project, building and running the

defensive. I guess that's human nature...they just

don't want to know that their tools are defective
or weak

engine that eve,yone works ojI.

There is resentment that the technical consultants no
longer provide support to the functional consultants, who
still regard themselves as the main actors. Technical

A lot of"finger pointing' is apparent, with each team using
the other as a scapegoat when things go wrong. Typical
comments from functional consultants about the technical
team included:

consultants are perceived as having "stolen the show" and

"doing their own thing," with little or no regard for the
The technical team don't understand what we
n.ed....77:ey're the ivoo; tower. They never give

needs or activities of the functional players. A functional
consultant expressed the sense of abandonment generally
felt by the functional team.

us what we want.
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Stereotyping is rampant, as a functional manager ex-

4.1.5

Asserting Control

plained.
The loss of autonomy that the functional analysts feel
There really is an us-them mentality. The func-

relative to the technical team frustrates their ambitions to
get the job done. The frustration and tension can some-

fional learn view the technical team as restrictive,

times lead to rebellious action, to a defiance of Beta's
norms that require team play, cooperation, and conformity.
A number of functional consultants described resorting to
sabotage of the CASE tools in order to reassert their sense
of control. For example, on a particularly technically
complex project with many CASE tools rigidly enforced by

while tlie latter view the former as unrealistic in
terms of budgets, efficiency, volumes.

4.1.4

Losing Autonomy

Functional consultants feel that they have lost autonomy by

the technical team, the control over systems development

having to follow the dictates of the technical team and
being forced to conform to the language of the CASE
tools. In particular, now that systems development work
consists primarily of interaction with CASE tools, the
functional consultants' designs and code are subject to
review by the technical team. This generates much

work was so effective that, as one functional manager

stated,

{It] drove people on the functional team to break
the tools light and left. As soon as things started
going wrong with the tools, we circumvented them

so that we could get on with our work,

resentment. A functional senior analyst's view is typical.

Without the tech team we would never have made

A functional consultant recounted a similar tale on another

the CASE tools work....But there is some resis-

project. His story is worth citing in full.

tance to their presence. When one of them would

On this project, the tech team had set up two

ask us to change the name of something, we'd
resent it. Who are they to tell us what to do?

kinds of ids to use the system.

The one was a

technical or powerful id which allowed you to
romp around in the operating system, create files,

etc.

With the CASE tools mediating systems development

The other was an id for the functional

people, for the coders, which only gave you access

activities, many of the tasks previously handled by analysts
are now automated. For example, screens and reports are
"ergonomically" designed by the tools on receipt of the data

to the coding panel (a menu ofoptions to use the

CASE tools) where you could onty edit or browse
files, compile programs, print program listings,
and you could not test some programs, look at

items to be displayed and up to 75 percent of the program

code for standard, transaction processing systems is
generated by the tools on receipt of a few customizing
parameters. Functional consultants no longer engage in

some files, or create new files. So we were very
restricted functionally, and we found this ex-

many detailed design and implementation processes. They
resent being excluded from decisions which directly impact

tremely limiting to our work. But the tools were
often causing a lot of unnecessary work. For
example, they would time and date stamp the

the form and functioning of the application systems they
are constructing for clients. In particular, the functional
consultants object to the technical team developing and
installing technical architecture and CASE tools without
consulting them, taking exception to having to use technology they did not help design. While some of this resentment may have existed before the onset of tools with the
systems software that functional consultants used, this
software was typically perceived as "in the background,"

object modules when they were compiled and the
test data when they were generated. And these
time and date stamps were often out ofsync. And
if they were out of sync the tools wouldn't let you

do anything like use the data to run an object
module, so we would have to run to the tech team
each time so they could fix things up. The tech
team was reluctant to give us technical ids or

and hence as dissociated from application work. CASE

their passwords so we could use their ids and fix

tools, however, directly confront the functional consultants
in the performance of their work, being very much in the

up things ourselves. They thought we'd wreak
havoc. But somehow technical passwords were
gotten hold of. Some people looked over the tech
consultants' shoulders; Ihad afriend on the tech
team so I could get hold of his. And we used
these powelful ids to go into the system and we

"foreground" of systems development work, mediating
almost everything the functional team does. A functional
consultant commented on the resentment that he and his
peers feel towards what they perceive as elitism among the
technical consultants.

changed our own ids to give us more power, so we
had greater functional capability. And we could

get on with our work. Of course when all this
came out, a big political stink blew up. We were

Tools have developed a tech team of egotists, who

feel they have all the knowledge, and thot the
more they can keep hidden from us, the more

told we weren't team players. But eventually we
convinced the tech team that we needed to mani-

knowledge and power they have and can keep.
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pulate a little more of the files. In the end they

(among their peers and in the larger "hacker" occupational

created a three-tiered system, with those who were

culture to which they feel some affiliation). In this sense,

fully technical like the tech team having all access,

exploiting the technology becomes an end in itself.

some who were semi-technical like us, who did
functional work but needed to sometimes go
around the tools, and then the fully functional
types like coders who only did application work

Technical consultants are process oriented, intent on action

rather than results. Information technology is more than
just instrumentally important to the technical consultants

and only used the coding panels.

significance as well. Technical consultants are less focused

in the execution of their tasks. It carries motivational

So a partial victory had been won for the functional
consultants who forced the technical team to give them
more computer capability, but the access given was very
much on the technical team's terms. The technical consultants managed to regain the control that had been tempo-

rarily usurped. They did not give the functional team more
powerful ids, which would have given the functional
consultants control over when and how to use or bypass
the tools. Instead the technical team modified the functional consultants' coding panels so that for a few simple
functions the functional consultants could exit the tools to
do a few restricted actions outside the realm of the tools.
However, this only allowed them to do a little more than
they were able to do before their revolt. More importantly
it did not give them the option to choose when and how to
use the tools.

Rebellions such as these are not common within Beta.
The strong corporate culture and ideology of teamwork
discourages dissension among the functional consultants,

on the immediate client problem and more interested in
finding a unique and elegant solution to the technical
problems at hand. While their time orientation is some-

what in the present, it also tends to look beyond the
current project to a more abstract, timeless level where
technical architectures and CASE tools are perfectible
according to some absolute criteria. Technical consultants
commonly rationalize why they spend inordinate amounts
of time recreating a routine or macro by claiming that their

products will be reused on future Beta projects in other
clients' sites. Hence (they argue) their work transcends
present-time and client-specific boundaries. That such
reuse is not commonly realized in practice seems of little
consequence to their motivation.
The context of technical consultants' work is defined by the

particular hardware and software configuration of the

current client's installation. While this context is specific
to projects, it is stripped of social or functional content by

the technical consultants' exclusive emphasis on the

who are concerned with personal career advancement and

technology. Their attitude towards information technology
reflects their greater involvement in process: the techno-

do not want to be labeled as "troublemakers." However,

logy (both CASE tools and the information technology

when rebellious action by functional consultants does
occur, it is particularly revealing. On the one hand, it
indicates how frustrating task restrictions can be to people
with the appropriate expertise who realize that things could
be done differently. On the other hand, it demonstrates

used to build application systems) is created and manipulated, and hence is not Objectified. It is not perceived as

that, socialization, corporate culture, and career ambitions

Akin to their functional counterparts, technical consultants

notwithstanding, individuals can and do act in ways that
undermine mechanisms of organizational control.

do not see themselves as system developers. While they do
subscribe to the "consultant" image, they augment this with
a constant reference to their status as technical innovators.

This self.image allows them to differentiate themselves
from the other team members. One technical senior
analyst noted,

4.2 Technical Subculture
4.2.1

a tool for getting their work done, but rather as constituting the arena on which their work is played out.

Technical Perspective

The contribution of technical people to Beta is
that we are crusaders. We find out all the neat

Technical consultants are typically attracted to Beta

things done in the labs and we figure out how to

because of their dual interest in technology and business.

import these into our monolithic development

environment and procedures.

For their first few years in the firm, however, business
interests play a secondary role, as the specialization of
roles on projects demands that they focus on technology.
Most technical consultants are more than happy to oblige.
While they acknowledge that the purpose of projects is to
solve functional problems, they welcome the opportunity
to concentrate exclusively on the computer medium and
leave the business details to their functional counterparts.
Many see the technology as the means through which they
can express and display their creativity and a way for them

An aspect of Beta that helps to keep the technical analysts

to learn new technical skills which are highly prized

consultants are heavily involved with the technology and

motivated is their participation in a strong and active
technical community. Part of this community is tied to the
computer "hacker" culture beyond Beta (Turkle 1984) with
which the technical consultants identify. Technical consultants pride themselves on being creative, which explains
their dislike for the functional consultants' preoccupation

with getting the application "out the door."
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Technical

Beta for barely a year, was able to limit the discretion of
functional consultants (two and three years his senior) and
client data processing personnel (with five to eight years
technical experience) through his authorization of their
CASE tool user profiles. His attitude is evident in this
rationdle he gave for restricting the computer capability of
other team members.

they can often avoid interacting with their colleagues and
users if they wish. A technical senior analyst remarked:

I pr*r to just do the technical stuff.

I get

quicker feedback that way. You do something
and then when you're finished it goes away. You
don't have users coming back all the time with

changes.
You show them [the non-technical members of the

There is a strong identification with being special and
different from the rest of the consultants in Beta. One

teaml the functions of the tool gradually, not atl
at once, as you want to get them going as fast as
possible. So you don't show them things they
won't need, or things that are too complicated as
you don't want to confuse them. So the principle
is show them as little as possible.

technical manager remarked:
All the technical people are so arrogant. We are
the spoilt rotten brats in Beta. We're told we are

so wonderful and we tend to believe it. We think
functional work is so easy anyone can do it.

In other circumstances, this technical consultant's approach
might be taken as evidence of a careful teacher who does
not want to overwhelm his/her students. However, on this

One means through which technical consultants reinforce

their difference is by maintaining their own internal

particular project, all the functional team members and
client data processing personnel were· technically experienced. It seems that the technical team's world-view

communication system. One of the local technical groups

publishes a regular newsletter, 77:e Technical 7Dnes, which

engenders a perception of other team members as neces-

is distributed to all technical consultants in Beta and which
contains reprints of topical articles,8 transcripts of presentations given at Beta meetings, and some notes by senior
technical managers. Another way of sustaining the techni-

sarily incompetent without tools. The consultant's attitude
is typical of most technical consultants, whatever the reality
of their functional team's experience and knowledge.

cal culture is through monthly local technical group
meetings, which usually comprise presentations of the

This dim view of their functional contemporaries is,

latest technology, research and design innovations so as to
keep the technical consultants technologically stimulated.

however, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The functional consultants' lack of exposure to technical issues

One such meeting, for example, spanned a whole day and

coupled with Beta providing little technical training to new

recruits is creating a growing pool of technically illiterate
functional consultants. This has the desired effect of
increasing the use of CASE tools on projects (hence
increasing Beta's project leveraging factor) while rein-

was devoted to the latest user interface technologies, with

a number of vendors bringing in their products and giving
hands-on demonstrations. Interspersed among the demonstrations were presentations by guest speakers and inhouse personnel on issues in ergonomic design and the

forcing the functional team's dependence on the technical

team.

dimensions of the person-machine interface. Such meetings and communications serve to strengthen the shared
meanings, values, and norms of the technical subculture,

as well as providing a forum in which to transmit and
reinforce such shared meanings and interests. The result

(repairing databases, installing new versions of tools,
creating backup copies of software and data, training tool
users, and answering technical questions) when they would

is a reaffirmation of technical consultants as special and
different from the rest of the consultants in the organization. This subculture identity in turn helps to sustain the
polarization of consultants on the project teams.
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It also has an unanticipated consequence, as it

requires technical consultants to be responsive to the now
more-dependent functional consultants. Technical consultants find themselves performing technical support tasks

prefer to be building advanced and complex technical
routines. A technical manager remarked:

With the tools and technical architecture we
completely hide CICS and DB2 from the pro-

Discounting the Functional Consultants

grammers, and can get incredible productivity
from them. But we also get uneducated programmers, who can't handle the smallest technical problem, and at the first sign of trouble they
go screaming for the tech learn.

The technical consultants tend to stereotype other team
members (whether functional consultants or client data
processing personnel) as "tool users" and hence as having
little understanding of the information technology underlying the tools. This allows the technical consultants to
rationalize their need to hide the tools from these "user
types." On projects, the status of actors in Beta and client
organizational hierarchies is less important than actors'
ability to wield technical control. On one project, for
example, a junior technical consultant, who had been with
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Resisting the Results Orientation

Notwithstandmg the extensive control that technical
consultants have over the conditions under which the
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functional team operates, the inherent results orientation

4.2.4

Summary of CASE Tools Research Study

of the Beta culture causes much frustration among technical consultants. For technical consultants, Beta's results
orientation is a major restriction on their creativity and a

constraint on their ability to refine the technical infrastructure they construct and maintain. They feel that a results

The deployment of CASE tools in Beta triggered structural
changes within the project teams, which institutionalized
the existing, formalized fragmentation of expertise into

technical and functional groupings.

Such a duality of

orientation is myopic and that such a short-term strategy
inhibits the development of good technical solutions.

interests, orientations, skills, and tasks on projects under-

Given the dependence of the whole team on the CASE
tools, the technical team's mandate is to get the tools
operational on the current computer environment as soon
as possible, in any way possible. But this does not allow
sufficient time for technical consultants to develop the
smart, elegant solutions they would like to. A technical

breeding subcultures and territorialism.

consultants commented that

It results in

tension and conflict on project teams that sometimes lead
to eruptions. The functional consultants seem typically to

lose out in these confrontations, as CASE tools are the
stated policy of Beta, and the technical consultants, as
implementors of this stated policy, have legitimacy and
Beta's resources on their side. Rebellion by functional
consultants is a way for them to reassert the autonomy they
feel the technical team has usurped. In time, such resent-

The budgetary restrictions on the project cause
problems in scope; they force a narrow view on

the tech team.

mines the homogeneity of the Beta "team" ideology by

ment may diminish as new functional consultants enter
Beta and take the presence of a powerful technical team

for granted. Not being aware of the prior division of labor,

This is frustrating for us, the

technical team, as we see and know what should

and not having been exposed to projects where technical
consultants were the "backroom guys," these functional

be done to improve, rejlne, and generalize the
tools we cany around from project to project, but

consultants are unlikely to feel a loss of control, centrality,

we can't do that....So it is frustrating for the

and territory.

technicat types who may have great ideas, but who
don't have the time to develop or implement them.

It is interesting to look at this issue of results orientation
from the other side. A functional senior analyst felt that
a belief in the "technical ./ir" pervaded Beta's technical
consultants.

The following section re-examines the findings described
above by interpreting them in terms of a broader social
theoretic framework so as to derive more general insight
into relations between technical experts and functional

workers around the deployment of information technology.
5.

There is a preoccupation with tools in Beta,
particularly from the technical groups. They are

THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION

The introduction of CASE tools in information systems

always in search of the golden goose that will save

development can be understood as an instance of the more

general phenomenon increasingly pervading contemporary

time and money. But that's just too simple.

organizations: the deployment of information technology
in core production activities. In the particular instance of
CASE tools in Beta, the production work being mediated

Another functional consultant remarked on technical team
priorities.

by information technology is the development of informa-

77:em is a feeling that they [the technical
nsportraconsul-

being deployed is a set of capabilities that support/

Pe

automate the activities of systems development. Recognizing this, the specific findings about social relations on
project teams using CASE tools can be articulated in terms

tion systems and the particular information technology

d basic
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tation. And we would rather they give us something to walk with, and then they can enhance it

of the more generic organizational processes of which they
are a microcosm.

letter to give us a racing car.

The insight provided by this study pertains to changes in
the division of labor and the relations of dependency on
project teams following the introduction of CASE tools.
This suggests that any substantial mediation of production

The standoff between these two orientations reflects the
functional interest in results and the technical interest in
technological innovation. It is a conflict that has to be
managed constantly and the burden of this falls on the

work by information technology can be expected to lead to

shoulders of the project managers, who must support their
functional analysts in getting the project completed on time
and within budget, but must also keep their technical
analysts motivated to provide a reliable, efficient and useful

changes in the division of labor and patterns of dependency

among the actors involved.

Introducing information

technology commits a production process to a technically

complex infrastructure of hardware, software, and proce-

system infrastructure.

dures that necessarily involves new forms of expertise. As

207

a result, specialized skills are needed to ensure the reliable

of social relations (Giddens 1976, p.112), so that one of the
ways in which the nature of change in social relations can

and effective mediation of production by information
technology. At least two ways of providing these skills are

be investigated is through studying shifts in power relations

possible.

among key actors. Power is the means of getting things

done and, as such, actors mobilize different resources that
1.

Iftheexistingproduction/functionalpersonnel areable

they bring to bear on their social interaction. It is through

to adequately manipulate the information technology,
they will be required to integrate technical skills into

power is exercised. In the light of the findings presented

their work.

differential possession of and access to these resources that

above, it is expected that in the context of production work
mediated by information technology, technical expertise
and unrestricted access to information technology become
significant resources around which power is mobilized.

In this case, functional workers also

become technical experts and social relations among
workers need not be disrupted (although disruptions

may result from the role conflict, ambiguity, and

The study of Beta further demonstrates that CASE tools,
as central elements in social interaction, generate conflict

overload that such an infusion of new tasks and skills

could engender within individuals). While this may
appear to be upskilling of work, in that the workers

now acquire technical skills, it need not be.

between functional and technical consultants on the project

Job

teams. Given differences among technical and functional

upskilling only occurs if the new skills increase the
discretion and autonomy of the workers on their jobs.
If the skills are required just so that workers can
perform the same tasks they executed before (with the

workers in perceptions, interests, and work-pressures, the
differential distribution of technical resources can be

same level of autonomy), there has been no upskilling

technology.

of work. It is important to note that the relationship
posited here refers to work and not to workers. The
processes of deskilling affecting jobs are not synonr
mous with those affecting individuals (Attewell 1985;
Lee 1981). For example, while a particular task may
be deskilled by being made simpler and more routine,

traditional bases of expertise and authority (hence power)
in the existing production process are threatened. With the

expected to lead to or accentuate social conflicts around

any production process being mediated by information

By deploying information technology in production,

the particular job incumbents may not be deskilled for
they may now work at the more skilled aspects of the

increased dependence on technical expertise, conflict arises
between the newly-arrived technical experts and the
established functional workers whose expertise and
authority is challenged and changed through the mediation

job, with the deskilled task being executed by a

of production work by information technology. How this

conflict is played out across various production arenas

different set of workers (who may well find that their
jobs have been upskilled).

2.

remains open to empirical elaboration. The technical
experts may triumph, institutionalizing their technocratic
dominance, or production workers may reassert control
through their continued resistance to the technical dependence that is now inherent in their computer-mediated
production tasks. Different outcomes will be generated
across different contexts and different outcomes may be
generated over time within the same context. While such
outcomes can never be predicted unequivocally, we can

Given the extreme specialization of roles commonly
experienced in organizations, however, it is unlikely

that functional workers will have the capability,
resources, or inclination to develop and maintain the

information technology that facilitates their daily work,
end-user computing notwithstanding. As the demand
for and supply of sophisticated and complex computer
capability escalates in advanced industrial economies,
it is probable that the information technology deployed
in production work will be beyond the scope of the
average end-user. In this case, functional workers will
merely use the information technology, while outside
expertise in the form of technical specialists will be
imported into the production process to develop and
maintain it. New technical expertise and new technology-management tasks are introduced into a given
production process and the existing division of labor

determine the likelihood of different patterns of response
based on an understanding of contexts, actors, and re-

sources. For example, it is expected that where production
workers have established legitimacy and influence -- say
they are accredited professionals (physicians or lawyers) --

it is more likely that institutionalized bases of authority
will persist, even in the face of information technology. On
the other hand, where production workers have little
credibility beyond the confines of their employing organization -- as in the case of Beta's functional consultants -- the

and patterns of dependency will certainly be affected,
as evidenced in Beta's experiences.

infringement of authority by technical specialists is more
probable.

In Beta's case, changes in tasks and expertise are reflected
through changes in social relations among project team
members. Rephrasing in more general terms, social
relations among the key actors in the production arena will
be affected as a consequence of deploying information

In Beta, there was a shift of power to technical experts as

prior, more established functional bases of power were
undermined. While the technical consultants exercised
considerable control over the circumstances under which

functional consultants worked, their power was not

inviolate. Functional consultants, as knowledgeable and

technology in production. Power is a feature of all forms
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More research is needed to determine the conditions under
which tensions between functional and technical project
personnel may be mitigated and when they are exacerbated. Of particular interest is determining how systems

capable agents, occasionally were able to recognize the

constraints on their behavior and take action to subvert the
power of the technical consultants. Thus, by refusing to
conform to the tools and the "team" way of doing things,
such functional workers reasserted their agency, underscoring the notion that power is always relational -- not a
static property of an individual or institution -- and not
only realized through social interaction (Giddens 1984).
They also risked their status and job security. The message here is that, when provoked sufficiently, individuals

development tasks are distributed among the three sets of
agents: application developers, tool facilitators, and the
actual CASE tools. Little is known about the longevity of
the disruptions and whether the territorialism, resentment,

and rebellion are transitory or more deeply rooted disjunc-

tures. There is some preliminary evidence for a generational effect, which leads to the speculation that as CASE
tools become more fully part of the systems development
"landscape," they will become more institutionalized, and
systems developers will be socialized into taking them for
granted. As such, tools may lose their potency as overt

can and do rebel against structural and technological
imperatives.
The frequency with which "power struggles" occur, and the
extent to which functional workers resist the conditions of
the power asymmetry in their work context, will determine
the amount of dominance technical experts amass. Where

symbols of power and harbingers of territorial threat. Less
conflict may result.

such resistance is weak or sporadic, the differential
distribution of technical resources will be reproduced over
time. Where technical experts are able to generate

Changing the social relations around the systems develop-

ment process, while clearly affecting the actors directly
involved, will also likely affect the indirect actors -- the
users -- who ultimately are the consumers of the final
product. CASE tools are often touted as increasing user
participation. How use of tools changes social relations
between users and system developers, and across different

outcomes by affecting the conduct of functional workersthrough the application of technical knowledge or manipulation of information technology -- such reproduction will
occur. Through their action or lack thereof, technical and

functional actors thus recreate the conditions of their
dependence relationship. In time, such power asymmetries

levels of users, contexts, and time, are significant areas of
future research. This study examined the use of CASE
tools in a software consulting firm, but CASE tools are
also being implemented with increasing rapidity in tradi-

become institutionalized into structures of domination.
However -- and this point must be stressed -- such patterns

of domination are not deterministic and where actors
deliberately take action that challenges existing conditions
and resource distributions, they have the potential to
transform rather than reproduce the power asymmetry.

tional data processing environments. While relations
between tool users and tool facilitators in such environments are anticipated to resemble those discussed above,

While dissension was present at Beta, it was not sufficiently

the unique practices of in-house systems development
provide a set of dimensions that may alter the social
relations affected by CASE tools. How the various shifts

strong or organized enough to achieve transformation and,
as was seen, the technical experts' dominance was sus-

tained (at least for the time period examined by the

in system development tasks, responsibility, and authority
-- occasioned by CASE tools -- are interpreted and acted

current study). Notwithstanding this, it is possible that in

on across different organizational contexts will require
comparative investigations over time to determine how
changes are institutionalized.

the future within Beta, as CASE tools become more
general, reliable and simple to use, the functional workers
will lose their reliance on technical experts. This would
attenuate the power of the technical experts as the value

of resources will have eroded. The existing patterns of
domination will in such circumstances not be reproduced
and new social structures will emerge.
6.

As production processes become mediated by information
technology, new technical expertise is introduced into the
production work. An important issue arising from this, not
explored in the current discussion, concerns the management of the new expertise. Given that production work is
central to the operation of an organizational unit, mediation of this work by information technology means that the
expertise responsible for maintaining the integrity of that
mediation is critical to the ongoing functioning of the unit.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has sketched out the ways in which social
relations on project teams can be disrupted and changed
as a consequence of deploying CASE tools. The findings
suggest implications for practice as well as directions for

A key question here is how does the existing authority
structure integrate the new forms of expertise without
undermining its power?

future research. Practitioners introducing CASE tools into
systems development efforts need to recognize that such

implementation will affect social relations among project
team members, reflecting the changes that result when any
significant mediation of work by information technology is
realized. Being sensitive to the potential disruption is an
important first step in managing the changes that CASE
tools will inevitably bring to the development process.

In general, the social relations view used here to interpret
the automation of systems development processes promises

to be a useful perspective within which to understand the
interdependent and dynamic social changes engendered by

the deployment of information technology in organizations.
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